“….where do you see the place of the Taliban within the Pashtoun culture? People often equate the two but my impression is that the Taliban is in fact opposed to traditional Pashtoun cultural and religious values. And one more question, how come there never has been a real, strong Pashtoun cultural nationalist movement? Over the last three decades, the Pashtouns' leadership, from Taraki to Mullah Omar, have joined supra-nationalist movements. I am just curious why. Sorry for bombarding you with questions but I know that you know a lot about these things so it would be great if you could share your views with us….”
Bellow is my response. All your comments and suggestions are welcome.
Pashtoon Cultural Nationalist Movement (PCNM)
PCNM issue has been always political, and hence difficult to become strong in both homelands of the Pashtoons, Afghanistan and in what is now Pakistan, but for different reasons.
- In Pakistan, the genuine PCNM has been often suppressed for its obvious anti-colonial, later anti-Punjabi stand. It has been basically a minority protest and liberation/autonomy movement.
- In Afghanistan, however, Pashtoons had been until recently, at least nominally, the majority and the pillars of power. They had been, or have been perceived by non-Pashtoon Afghans as, the dominant ethnic group. Any attempt of a revival of PCNM has been tainted by this fact.
- Since in the past the political power in Afghanistan has been in the hand of Pashtoons (ironically many of the Pashtoon power elites were even not able to speak Pashto!), and their Pashtoon ethnic belonging has served mainly their hold on to power, any official attempt of a cultural revival by the Pashtoon elites has been necessarily hegemonic and exclusive, or perceived as such by non-Pashtoons which amounts to the same (btw, nothing unique in a not-fully-democratic multi-ethnic country, as in comparable examples of say Yugoslavia, Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, China etc.)
- The few non-governmental PCNM attempts have been also political and were/are aiming at strengthening the supposedly traditional 'right' to Pashtoon dominance in Afghanistan (Afghan Melat etc.), or were perceived as such by non-Pashtoons which amounts again to the same.
- The Pashtoon centered Afghan national identity has failed to represnet a genuine natioanl identity for all Afghans (as also all the recent and exclusive attempts for a new national identity by other ethnic, linguistic and religious entities will fail). Curiously, the majority of Afghans, Pashtoon or non-Pashtoon, do suscribe to an Afghan identity, but pressed further, it will turn out that most see their particular cultural, lingusitic or religious entities as being, or as deserving to be, in the center of that perceived identity.
This in turn has made any attempts at PCNM to be perceived as a contra-national identity in the muti-ethnic, muti-linguist Afghan society. - The presence of Pashtoon personalities in supra-nationalist movements from extreme left to extreme right has served, or has been perceived to serve, Pashtoon dominance , but it hasn't contributed (as you correctly mention) to a strengthening of PCNM for the obvious and by the actors stated reasons of a supra-nationalist ideology (internationalist, national-democratic - or "communist", to use a Western cliché - and Isamic/Jahadist/Pan-Islamic).
- The deeply tribal, conservative and traditional lifestyle of the majority of traditional Pashtoons has been always suspicious of any "modern" attempt of a PCNM (always a project of Pashtoon political elites and "intellectuals"), as it is the case with any form of modernization that threatens the tribal thinking, values and the traditional desire for autonomy.
- A Pashtoon is loyal first and foremost to himself! (like most people with tribal mentality, but Pashtoons have persevered this evolutionary thread amazingly intact into modern times)
His commitment to any cause outside his individual existence is very conditional and limited, and to the extent he identifies that cause as beneficial to his survival. In the later case, he fights to death for it!
The famous anecdotal, and certainly derogatory, statement (supposedly by a former British prime minister) contains a big chunk of truth, not just about Pashtoons: "You can't buy Afghans, but you can lease them!" - I know this is a controversial historic issue since there were other Afghan ethnicities too participating in the struggle for Afghan independence without being always acknowledged by the Pashtoon "nationalists", and many Pashtoons were serving colonialists.
- While all the Mujahedeen groups (the famous 7) were dependent on, directed, used, financed and controlled by Pakistanis and their ISI, Pakistan gave preferential treatment to the Pashtoon dominated groups for obvious political reasons. It started with G. Hekmatyar with his "federation" fantasies for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Haqqani, both Islamic zealots and Pashtoons.
- This Pakistani policy culminated in creation of Taliban, a group exclusively recruited from among the Pashtoons. See how successfully the Pakistanis (may I say: the loyal servants of Britain!) used Pashtoons for their own political agendas! Pakistan turned the once so feared Pashtoon weapon against Afghans, including other innocent Pashtoons. This, however, happened under an Islamic flag. The Pashtoon Taliban in Afghanistan, and now in Pakistan, morphed into bizarre monsters, a blend of Pashtoon tribalism, Islamic ideology - anti-modern, anti-former-Mujahedeen, anti-non-Pashtoon, anti-Shia, anti-Iran, but Al Qaeda-, Saudi-, Pakistan- and ISI-friendly! (However, Pakistan itself will certainly pay a high price for creating this monster.)
- Through this betrayal of Afghanistan, Taliban have harmed the Pashtoons in Afghanistan the most! They made the majority of the Pashtoons pay for the crimes of Taliban until toady. The helped deepen the ethnic and religious divide to new depths. They discredited all the Pashtoon causes, including the legitimate ones such as a healthy PCNM, in eyes of the non-Pashtoon Afghans and the world. As result of Taliban's actions, some narrow-minded Afghans regard all Pashtoons guilty by ethnic association. Of course, the mostly effected civilian victims of the conflict in Afghanistan, now mainly Pashtoons, pay the price with their suffering.
- The current Afghan government, an artificial and corrupt system of different elements (but certainly with many good individuals in it), although with significant formal Pashtoon presence is eyed by most Pashtoons (and non-Pashtoons alike) with suspicion. The national and international reconstruction and pacification efforts are failing mostly in the Southern Pashtoon homelands.
(I'm generalizing now gravely)
Nonetheless, Pashtoons could once claim, and rightly so, to be at the forefront of the fight against British colonialism, and for Afghan national independence. Afghans in general, Pashtoons in particular, took, and still take, pride in their anti-Pakistani stand too, as they perceived their conflict with Pakistan as continuation of their anti-colonial struggle. That has been an often unmentioned justification of Pashtoon dominance in 20th century Afghanistan (partially accepted, unwillingly or willingly, by non-Pashtoon Afghans).
Conclusion
A Pashtoon cultural nationalistic movement (PCNM) is needed and possible in future of the country, but we'll be very lucky if we see it in our life time.
This PCNM, however, has to be based on a new and just relationship between all the ethnicities of Afghanistan, and on a new and inclusive national vision in which all Afghans with their different cultural and linguistic values can share . Pashtoons have to recognize past injustices done in their names. They have to accept and acknowledge that many non-Pashtoons have the right of telling their side of our story, and that not every search for a non-Pashtoon Afghan identity is against Pashtoons. Of course, the same goes for the non-Pashtoons. They might have now even a bigger responsibility: not responding to past real and perceived injustice with injustice, to help their countrymen now suffering the most back on their feet, to help their "older" Pashtoon - at times unfair, but nonetheless - brothers and sisters in times of their greatest suffering.
In the moment, any attempt at PCNM will be seen by the local Pashtoons as irrelevant, and by the non-Pashtoons as just another attempt at Pashtoon dominance.
I hope I could provide some reasons for lack of PCNM in the past, and some hope for a future Pashtoon Cultural Nationalistic Movement. Needless to say that all the above mentioned is my subjective view. Many of my fellow Pashtoon and non-Pashtoon Afghans will disagree with me and I'm open to suggestions and corrections.
